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On Restating Products Liability Preemption 
Mary J. Davis† 
The opportunity to reflect on the impact of the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability1 since its adoption by the American 
Law Institute in 1998 and its interaction with the ever-changing 
preemption landscape is a fascinating one.  Many have written on the 
subject of federal preemption of products liability actions generally2 and 
on the narrower subject of preemption by particular federal regulatory 
action, whether by Congress directly or by an administrative agency.3 As 
a way of framing the discussion at the symposium celebrating the 10th 
Anniversary of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 
(“Products Liability Restatement”), our organizers asked the following 
question: “Now that the Supreme Court has manifested a strong interest 
in federal preemption of common law personal-injury doctrine, should 
  
 †  Stites & Harbison Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Administration and 
Faculty Development, University of Kentucky College of Law. Many thanks to Professors Aaron 
Twerski and Anita Bernstein for organizing this symposium to celebrate the 10th Anniversary of the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, and for their products liability scholarship 
generally which has so richly contributed to this field. Their insights and thoughtful comments on 
the subject of preemption and products liability have been particularly valuable to me. 
 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. (1998).  
 2 See generally THOMAS O. MCGARITY, THE PREEMPTION WAR: WHEN FEDERAL 
BUREAUCRACIES TRUMP LOCAL JURIES (2008); Richard C. Ausness, Preemption of State Tort Law 
by Federal Safety Statutes: Supreme Court Preemption Jurisprudence Since Cipollone, 92 KY. L.J. 
913 (2004) (surveying Supreme Court preemption doctrine); Mary J. Davis, On Preemption, 
Congressional Intent, and Conflict of Laws, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 181 (2004) (suggesting a conflict of 
laws analysis for preemption problems); Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of 
Preemption, 53 S.C. L. REV. 967 (2002) [hereinafter Davis, Unmasking the Presumption] (providing 
an historical grounding in preemption cases and an introduction to the doctrine generally); Catherine 
M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449 
(2008) (discussing institutional competence issues in federal preemption by agency action). This list 
is by no means intended to be exhaustive, but illustrates the richness of the scholarship in this area. 
 3 Most recently, the subject of preemption by the Federal Food and Drug 
Administration’s actions has been a popular subject because it involves not express preemption but 
implied preemption, which the Supreme Court has only addressed occasionally in recent years. The 
Court has decided an implied preemption case this term in Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009), 
involving preemption of state common law failure-to-warn claims based on FDA-approved 
pharmaceutical labeling. The Wyeth case and preemption by the FDA was the subject of lively 
debate at the Products Liability Restatement 10th Anniversary Symposium. I thank the other panel 
participants, Professor Robert Rabin, Malcolm Wheeler, and Sheila Birnbaum for the engaging 
discussion. For my position on that issue, see Mary J. Davis, The Battle Over Implied Preemption: 
Products Liability and the FDA, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1089 (2007) [hereinafter Davis, The Battle Over 
Implied Preemption]. For other writing on that subject, see Richard A. Epstein, Why the FDA Must 
Preempt Tort Litigation: A Critique of Chevron Deference and a Response to Richard Nagareda, 1 
J. TORT LAW art. 5 (2006); Richard A. Nagareda, FDA Preemption: When Tort Law Meets the 
Administrative State, 1 J. TORT LAW art. 4 (2006); Peter H. Schuck, FDA Preemption of State Tort 
Law in Drug Regulation: Finding the Sweet Spot, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIV. L. REV. 73 (2008). 
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this topic (omitted in 1998) join the Restatement?” The Reporters of the 
Products Liability Restatement correctly concluded, in section 4, 
comment e, dealing with the effect of statutes and regulations on 
liability, that, “The complex set of rules and standards for resolving 
questions of federal preemption are beyond the scope of this 
Restatement.”4 After almost two decades of struggle in the Supreme 
Court over products liability preemption, the subject is still beyond the 
scope of the Products Liability Restatement, or any Restatement project, 
and is likely to be so for a while.  
Many reasons exist for the continuing state of uncertainty in 
preemption doctrine. Even though the Supreme Court has regularly 
decided cases involving preemption of products liability actions since its 
initial foray into the subject in 1992 in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,5 
the Court’s keen interest in the subject has not resulted in a predictable 
doctrinal approach.6 In addition, some have questioned the Supreme 
Court’s motives in addressing the subject so frequently, causing many 
observers to opine about the “politics of preemption,”7 which includes 
concerns about the doctrine’s relationship to tort reform movements8 and 
the tension, even among pro-preemption advocates, about unwarranted 
federal intrusion into spheres of traditional state regulation as a matter of 
respecting principles of federalism.9   Before Cipollone, the Supreme 
Court had not decided a products liability preemption case and had only 
rarely decided any case pitting state common law damages actions 
against a federal regulatory scheme.10 Since Cipollone, the Court has 
decided nine products liability preemption cases,11 the most recent the 
  
 4 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 4, cmt. e (1998). 
 5 505 U.S. 504 (1992). 
 6 See infra notes 49-72 and accompanying text.  
 7 Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 229 (2000) (noting that “the politics of 
preemption are complicated”). 
 8 MARGARET H. CLUNE, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REGULATION, STEALTH TORT REFORM: 
HOW THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S AGGRESSIVE USE OF THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE HURTS 
CONSUMERS 1 (2004), available at http://www.progressiveregulation.org/articles/preemption.pdf; see 
also Terry Carter, The Pre-emption Prescription, 94 ABA J. 42, 46-47 (2008) (discussing the politics 
surrounding pharmaceutical preemption decisions). 
 9 See, e.g., Davis, Unmasking the Presumption, supra note 2, at 969 (“[P]reemption is 
about power and politics because it involves the fundamental balance of Congress’s power in 
relation to the states. . . . To the extent that the Supreme Court has something to say about the power 
struggle of federalism, it speaks, partially at least, through its preemption decisions.”); Nelson, supra 
note 7, at 229; Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court Inc., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2008, § MM (Magazine), at 
38; see also Catherine M. Sharkey, What Riegel Portends for FDA Preemption of State Law 
Products Liability Claims, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLL. 415, 417 & n.12 (2008) (noting that 
preemption decisions regularly involve policy decisions and describing the policy preference model 
of Supreme Court decision-making noted by political scientists). 
 10 See Davis, Unmasking the Presumption, supra note 2, at 998.  
 11 Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999 
(2008); Warner-Lambert, Co. v. Kent, 126 S. Ct. 1168 (2008) (per curiam); Bates v. Dow 
Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005); Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51 (2002); 
Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 
U.S. 861 (2000); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996); Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 
U.S. 280 (1995). In addition, the Court decided two cases involving preemption of state tort claims 
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highly anticipated Wyeth v. Levine,12 involving implied preemption of 
state law-based pharmaceutical failure-to-warn claims by the Federal 
Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA’s) product labeling approval 
decisions. The number of preemption decisions decided by the Court in 
the last two decades that involved common law damages actions is 
extraordinary, a record pace by any measure for a subject that had 
received only scant attention during the prior century.13 Given the 
Supreme Court’s continuing interest in the subject of preemption,14 the 
relentless pursuit of preemption by regulated industries as a way to limit 
liability exposure, and the variety of issues presented by the cases,15 the 
continuing substantial uncertainty about the state of the doctrine counsels 
against any attempt to restate it. 
To state the black-letter law of federal preemption would, in 
truth, be a fairly simple task.16 Preemption of state law stems from the 
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution17 which the Court 
has long held requires an assessment of Congressional purpose.18 To that 
end, the Court has defined express and implied preemption doctrines. 
Express preemption exists when a statutory provision provides the scope 
of Congress’ intent to preempt, and its scope must be evaluated through 
an assessment of the statutory language, its structure, and, there is 
disagreement here, its purpose as discerned through the legislative 
history.19 Implied preemption doctrines substitute for Congress’ express 
intent to preempt a judicial determination that Congress would have 
wanted federal laws to govern when state laws create an actual conflict 
with federal objectives or make it impossible to comply with both federal 
  
by the Federal Railroad Safety Act, Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344 (1999), 
and CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 (1993), and two cases involving 
preemption of state regulation under the federal cigarette labeling laws, Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 
129 S. Ct. 538 (2008) (no express preemption of state fraud-based consumer protection litigation), 
and Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (state cigarette advertising regulations 
expressly preempted). 
 12 Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009). For a discussion of Wyeth, see supra notes 
113-128 and accompanying text. 
 13 See Davis, Unmasking the Presumption, supra note 2, at 998. 
 14 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1441, 1442 (2008) (“In short, there are few topics relating the Supreme Court’s statutory 
jurisprudence that are as important as agency inputs into preemption decisions, and none that are 
more important.”). 
 15 From whether state consumer trade regulations are preempted by express preemption 
provisions, see Altria Group, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 538, to whether product-specific labeling decisions 
impliedly preempt common law claims, see Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. 1187, it is clear that aggressive 
preemption arguments can continue to be expected. 
 16 See, e.g., DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 14.4 (2d ed. 2008). 
 17 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“The Constitution, and laws of the United states which shall 
be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land. . . . ”). 
 18 See Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963) (stating that “the purpose 
of Congress is the ultimate touchstone” in preemption analysis). 
 19 See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992). For the continuing 
debate on these seemingly straightforward principles, see Altria Group, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 538 and the 
debate between the majority opinion of Justice Stevens and the dissenting opinion of Justice 
Thomas. Altria Group, Inc. is discussed infra notes 108-112 and accompanying text. 
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and state obligations.20  Implementing implied preemption doctrines 
often requires judges to cut at the joint between overlapping federal 
objectives and important state prerogatives and, therefore, is a sensitive 
inquiry. A variety of factors has been important to the Court’s implied 
preemption doctrine over the years21 and it might be possible to “restate” 
those in a catalogue-type way if one were so inclined.22 
Our symposium organizers likely asked the framing question 
rhetorically, however, understanding that the debate over preemption of 
products liability personal injury actions is about much more than the 
doctrine itself. It provides a much broader canvas than that. Rather, it 
provides the opportunity to examine a number of considerations that are 
not directly related to the details of preemption doctrine or whether that 
doctrine is ready to be “restated” in the American Law Institute way. 
That is why this opportunity is such a fascinating one. 
The considerations to which I refer are both doctrinal and 
normative. They relate to the way preemption doctrine has evolved in the 
past two decades and to the question of whether the current trend in 
preemption doctrine, toward increased preemption of state common law 
personal injury actions, strikes the right balance between federal interests 
in certainty and uniformity of regulation and the interests of those 
harmed by the unrelenting risks produced by some regulated industries. 
The Supreme Court’s own struggle over this balance supports a narrow 
vision of preemption doctrine. I also suggest that to restate preemption 
doctrine that codifies a rule that places the risk of uncertainty on the 
future victim of that risk, absent unquestionable congressional intent to 
do so, or clear, focused analysis that openly takes those victims’ interests 
into account, does not strike that balance appropriately. 
This Article provides a brief explanation of the state of  
preemption doctrine and explains how the Court altered, quite 
dramatically, its treatment of preemption of common law tort actions in 
the last two decades. The Court’s almost exclusive focus on the 
interpretation of express preemption provisions, which never specifically 
address common law tort claims one way or the other, turned 
“traditional” preemption analysis of common law tort claims on its head. 
The Court then, almost as suddenly, signaled a retreat from the emphasis 
on express preemption analysis and returned, awkwardly, to implied 
preemption doctrine.23 The Court has only recently begun meaningful 
  
 20  See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516-17. 
 21 See Davis, Unmasking the Presumption, supra note 2, at 1013-14. 
 22 See, e.g., Davis, The Battle Over Implied Preemption, supra note 3, at 1138-51 
(applying identified factors in implied conflict preemption to failure-to-warn claims involving 
pharmaceuticals). 
 23 Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 884 (2000). The Court had 
foreshadowed this result in Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 288-89 (1995). For a 
discussion of Geier, see infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text. 
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modern analysis of implied preemption,24 particularly with its decisions 
Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.25 and Wyeth v. Levine,26 and that 
doctrine will require years of fleshing out by the Court’s current 
members.27 After describing the current, uneasy state of preemption 
doctrine, this Article will provide a few observations about the normative 
inquiry regarding what preemption doctrine should, and should not, be 
accomplishing. 
The effort to identify congressional intent to preempt has always 
been central to the preemption inquiry. As mentioned earlier, under the 
command of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution,28 the Court has 
obligated itself to identify and follow the “clear and manifest purpose of 
Congress”29 to assess the preemptive scope of federal legislation. It must 
be remembered that before Cipollone in 1992, the Court had only rarely 
found common law tort claims to be contained within the scope of any 
express preemption provision, much less had it found such claims 
impliedly preempted.30 With its opinion in Cipollone, the Court began in 
earnest to shift the focus on determining congressional intent by 
inquiring into the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms of express 
preemption provisions.31   
Cipollone is an example of the difficulty of that inquiry as it 
applies to common law tort claims. The case involved the question of 
whether the preemption provision of the federal cigarette labeling laws, 
the Federal Cigarette Labeling Act of 1965, as amended by the Public 
Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969,32 preempted tort claims arising 
out of cigarette smoking-related health problems.33 Neither statute 
  
 24 Geier, 529 U.S. 861, and Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51 (2002), both 
involved express preemption provisions that the Court concluded did not preempt the claims in issue 
and implied conflict preemption analyses which supported preemption in Geier but not in Sprietsma. 
See infra notes 55-59, 69-71 and accompanying text; see also Davis, The Battle Over Implied 
Preemption, supra note 3, at 1124-27, 1129-30. 
 25 529 U.S. 861 (2000). 
 26 Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009). 
 27 Indeed, watching how the Justices line up on the preemption scorecard has been 
somewhat of a pastime for many observers of preemption jurisprudence. See, e.g., Sharkey, supra 
note 9, at 419, 428-29 (discussing the unusual 8-to-1 decision in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 
999 (2008), involving Medical Device Amendments preemption). After attempting to predict how 
the Court would answer the Federal Boat Safety Act preemption question in Sprietsma v. Mercury 
Marine, I have given up on prognosticating where preemption is concerned. See Davis, Unmasking 
the Presumption, supra note 2, at 1025-28.  
 28 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. For a thorough analysis of the history of this provision and 
its meaning in historical context, see Nelson, supra note 7, at 232-64. 
 29 Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Malone v. White Motor 
Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978) (congressional intent is “the ultimate touchstone” of preemption 
analysis (quoting Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963))).  
 30 See Davis, Unmasking the Presumption, supra note 2, at 998. 
 31 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992) (stating that express 
preemption controls when it provides “reliable indicium of congressional intent” to be discerned by 
interpretation of statutory language (quoting Malone, 435 U.S. at 505)). 
 32 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (2006); Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 514-15. 
 33  Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 508-09. 
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specifically mentioned common law damages claims, but rather stated, 
respectively, that the states may not impose any “statement” or 
“requirement or prohibition” “relating to smoking and health” in 
cigarette packaging or advertising.34 All the Justices in Cipollone agreed 
that the preemption analysis should proceed by an interpretation of the 
scope of the express preemption provision,35 but that is where the 
agreement ended.  
The majority opinion, authored by Justice Stevens,36 summarized 
the state of preemption doctrine and then engaged in a “fair[] but . . . 
narrow[]” interpretation of the provisions in issue with sensitivity to the 
presumption against preemption where matters historically within the 
police powers of the state are involved.37  The majority concluded, 
therefore, that the 1965 Act did not preempt any common law tort 
actions.38 A plurality of Justices then concluded that the 1969 Act’s 
language, preempting state law “requirements or prohibitions,” 
preempted some but not all of the claims.39 Even the plurality was not 
entirely true to the task of fair but narrow statutory interpretation based 
on the presumption against preemption: the plurality found that the 1969 
Act preempted some claims because of the change in the preemption 
provision’s language, even though Congress specifically stated in the 
legislative history of the 1969 Act that it did not intend to alter the scope 
of the preemption provision from its previous version.40 
Three concurring Justices found no express preemption at all, 
resting on the premise that common law damages actions have at most an 
indirect regulatory effect and, therefore, do not impose either 
requirements or prohibitions inconsistent with Congress’ intent.41  Justice 
Blackmun, speaking for this group, recognized the Court’s long tradition 
of declining “to find the regulatory effects of state tort law direct or 
  
 34 Id. at 514-15 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1334). 
 35 See id. at 516; id. at 531 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 
545-46 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 36 Justice Stevens has authored many of the Court’s preemption opinions including, in 
addition to Cipollone, the opinions of the Court in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996), 
Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51 (2002), Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 
(2005), and, most recently, Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008), which confirms the 
viability of the plurality opinion’s analysis in Cipollone. 
 37 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 518, 523 (plurality opinion). 
 38 Id. at 519-20. 
 39 Id. at 521. 
 40 Id. (“The phrase ‘[n]o requirement or prohibition’ sweeps broadly and suggests no 
distinction between positive enactments and common law; to the contrary, those words easily 
encompass obligations that take the form of common-law rules.”) (quoting Public Health Cigarette 
Smoking Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2006)). The plurality opinion found partial preemption 
of those damages actions whose predicate is a “requirement or prohibition based on smoking and 
health.” Id. at 524. The Court dismissed Congress’ statement in the legislative history regarding no 
intended change in scope of the preemption provision as inconsistent with the plain meaning of the 
statute’s language. Id. at 520-21 & n.19. 
 41 Id. at 535-36 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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substantial enough to warrant pre-emption.”42 The two remaining 
Justices, Scalia and Thomas, found complete preemption based on the 
“apparent meaning” of the same words.43 So, the stage was set for 
decades of confusing express preemption analysis and relentless 
arguments that Congress intended words like “requirements” to include 
common law damages actions. 
The Cipollone court also addressed the presumption against 
preemption of state law in areas involving the historic police powers of 
the state, including matters of public health and safety.44 The Court 
disagreed about the presumption then, and continues to disagree about 
it.45 The Cipollone plurality said that express preemption provisions 
should be fairly but narrowly interpreted, being informed by an 
understanding of the value of the long tradition of tort law that 
complemented federal regulation of public health and safety.46 That 
understanding reflected the federalism balance struck by historical 
preemption jurisprudence over the previous seventy years.47 Implied 
preemption played no role in Cipollone, though the Court had 
emphasized implied preemption analysis in its discussion of preemption 
of common law damages actions throughout history.48 
The Court’s post-Cipollone opinions have been similarly 
fractured, though in differing ways. First, the Court has continued to 
struggle with determining the scope of express preemption provisions. 
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,49 involving the Medical Device Amendments to 
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, is another example of the 
Court’s struggle with express preemption principles.50 In Lohr, the 
  
 42 Id. at 537.   
 43 Id. at 544 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia’s dissent 
figures prominently in Justice Thomas’ dissent in Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 551 
(2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting), discussed infra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 44 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 518. For a fuller discussion of the “presumption against 
preemption,” see Davis, Unmasking the Presumption, supra note 2. 
 45 See Davis, The Battle Over Implied Preemption, supra note 3, at 1132-34; Davis, 
Unmasking the Presumption, supra note 2, at 1013-14. 
 46 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516. 
 47 See Davis, Unmasking the Presumption, supra note 2, at 972-97.  
 48 See id.  
 49 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 US. 470 (1996). 
 50 The preemption provision of the MDA, added to the FDCA in 1976 and at issue in 
Lohr, stated that states may not impose “requirement[s] . . . different from or in addition to” any 
federal requirement “relate[d] to safety or effectiveness.” 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006). The three 
opinions in Lohr revisited the disagreement begun in Cipollone over whether “requirement” was 
intended to mean common law damages actions and how express preemption provisions were to be 
read, whether neutrally or with an understanding of the presumption against preemption in the case 
of historic state police powers. See Davis, Unmasking the Presumption, supra note 2, at 1002-04. 
Five justices found that the provision did not preempt any claims against the medical device 
manufacturer, with Justice Breyer’s concurrence being critical to the holding. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 503 
(Breyer, J., concurring). He suggested that common law damages actions could be requirements, but 
they were not intended to be so based on the preemption provision’s language and the FDA’s 
regulation implementing the provision. Id. at 503-04. For additional discussion of Lohr and MDA 
preemption, see Richard C. Ausness, “After you, My Dear Alphonse!”: Should the Courts Defer to 
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manufacturers of a medical device that had been approved under a 
grandfathering method known as pre-market notification argued that the 
MDA’s preemption provision preempted common law tort claims based 
on alleged defects in the device’s design, warning, and manufacture.51 
The Court was again divided on the meaning of the term “requirements,” 
with a plurality considering that it did not preempt the claims in issue 
under a narrow interpretation of the statute and its implementing 
regulations,52 but a majority, four in dissent and one concurring in the 
result, disagreed.53 
With such disagreement, it is no wonder that commentators 
opined that Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr was a “veiled implied preemption 
analysis”54 in express preemption clothing, because the Justices 
continued to debate whether Congress intended to include common law 
damages actions within the meaning of the term “requirement.” Those 
commentators might be called prescient. Four years later in Geier v. 
American Honda Motor Co.,55 the Court found that an express 
preemption provision, arguably clearer than that involved in Lohr, which 
prohibited state “standards” that were not identical to the statutorily-
defined minimum federal standards in issue, did not expressly preempt a 
design defect claim based on failure to include an air bag, but that 
implied conflict preemption principles did bar the claim.56 This result is 
even more remarkable given that the legislation in issue, the National 
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (NTMVSA),57 contains a savings 
clause, which states that compliance with a federal standard “does not 
exempt a person from liability at common law.”58 The majority opinion 
in Geier said nothing about the presumption against preemption nor did 
it engage in a particularly meaningful evaluation of the actual terms of 
the express preemption provision, as one would have expected after 
Cipollone and Lohr.59 
  
the FDA’s New Interpretation of § 360k(a) of the Medical Device Amendments?, 80 TUL. L. REV. 
727, 767-75 (2006); Davis, Unmasking the Presumption, supra note 2, at 1002-04. 
 51 Lohr, 518 U.S. at 480-83. 
 52 Id. at 492-94. 
 53 Id. at 508 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 509 
(O’Connor, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 54 See Davis, Unmasking the Presumption, supra note 2, at 1004. 
 55 529 U.S. 861 (2000). 
 56 Id. at 865-87. 
 57 The NTMVSA of 1966, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1988) (repealed 1994), is currently 
codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101-30169 (2000). 
 58 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k) (1988). I am delighted to have been able to discuss Geier with 
Malcolm Wheeler, Wheeler Trigg Kennedy LLP, at the symposium. Malcolm successfully argued 
Geier for the defendants. I happen to agree with the dissent in Geier that neither express nor implied 
preemption were justified. Geier, 529 U.S. at 886 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See generally Ralph 
Nader & Joseph A. Page, Automobile-Design Liability and Compliance with Federal Standards, 64 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 415 (1996) (arguing against preemption under NTMVSA). 
 59 See Davis, Unmasking the Presumption, supra note 2, at 1006-07. 
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The implied preemption analysis from Geier is an important 
modern exploration by the Court of implied conflict preemption and for 
that reason is likely to be very influential going forward.60 The Court did 
not discuss the presumption against preemption per se61 but did identify 
features of the air bag regulatory scheme and its history that informed the 
assessment of actual conflict. The Court reviewed a wide range of factors 
in determining actual conflict: the history of the regulation, the views of 
the various Secretaries of Transportation on the objectives of the 
standard, as well as the published comments to the various versions of 
the standard.62 The obvious effort by Department of Transportation 
officials to balance the interests of the regulated industry and the 
consuming public during the evolution of the standard influenced the 
Court in its determination that state tort laws would have an 
impermissible impact on the implementation of those objectives.63  The 
Court also discussed the relevance of the Secretary’s position on 
preemption and how much weight to place on the Department of 
Transportation’s assessment of conflict.64 The lack of a formal statement 
on preemption was not determinative, though the Court seemed uneasy 
about how to treat less-than-formal expressions of agency position.65 
In the eight years between Cipollone and Geier, then, the Court’s 
preemption doctrine stood on shifting sand. With every new case, the 
Court resisted discussing the “presumption against preemption” and 
struggled with how to balance the historic role of state tort law in 
regulating product safety. Subsequent cases continued to reflect that 
conflict. In Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs Legal Committee,66 the Court 
conducted an implied preemption analysis under the Medical Device 
Amendments, after quickly concluding that the plaintiff’s fraud-on-the-
FDA claims were not expressly preempted.67 Because policing fraud on a 
federal agency was uniquely federal and not traditionally governed by 
the states, the Court concluded that the presumption against preemption 
  
 60 See Davis, The Battle Over Implied Preemption, supra note 3, at 1124-27. The Court 
discussed Geier at length in Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009), in applying implied 
preemption principles to the pharmaceutical labeling claims involved there. The FDCA does not 
have an express preemption provision related to its pharmaceutical approval provisions. See Wyeth, 
129 S. Ct. at 1195-96 (discussing history of FDCA and noting that Congress did not include an 
express preemption provision for pharmaceutical approvals when it added the express preemption 
provision in the Medical Device Amendments in 1976); see also Caraker v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 
172 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1035 (S.D. Ill. 2001) (explaining that the portion of FDCA dealing with 
pharmaceuticals does not contain a preemption provision). 
 61 Geier, 529 U.S. at 869-72; see also id. at 894 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 62 Id. at 877-85. 
 63 Id. at 882-83. For a more elaborate discussion of the Geier implied conflict preemption 
analysis, see Davis, The Battle Over Implied Preemption, supra note 3, at 1124-27. 
 64 Geier, 529 U.S. at 883. 
 65  Id. at 884-85. 
 66  531 U.S. 341 (2001). 
 67 Id. at 347-48. 
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did not operate and that the state-law based claims were preempted.68 In 
Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine,69 the Court similarly concluded that the 
Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971 did not expressly preempt design defect 
claims based on a failure to equip a recreational vessel with a propeller 
guard even though the Coast Guard had studied the matter and declined 
to require the guards.70 The Court also found no implied preemption 
because the Coast Guard regulations preserved state authority in the 
absence of federal action, and the Coast Guard previously had been in 
favor of permitting state common law claims.71  The Court in Sprietsma 
unanimously concluded that the more prominent safety objective in the 
federal statutory scheme justified maintaining complementary common 
law remedies.72 The unanimity was remarkable in itself for a subject 
about which the Court had been so fractured. 
At this point, it would be well to highlight the importance of 
federal agency position on preemption analysis.73 One of the main issues 
in preemption analysis present in virtually every case, except Cipollone, 
is how much weight to give the relevant federal agency’s position on the 
matter. An agency position articulating the federal objectives at stake and 
assessing whether those objectives preempt state tort claims might 
properly inform the preemption analysis as a substitute for congressional 
intent when determining whether an actual conflict exists. The Court has 
recognized the need, in some cases, to defer to agency interpretations of 
statutes and administrative regulations, but whether to defer to agency 
position on preemption of state common law has proved more 
troublesome. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, involved an FDA regulation 
implementing the statutory preemption provision; the majority opinion 
was “substantially informed” by that regulation because it had been 
formally adopted and because of the agency’s “unique role” enforcing 
the statute.74 Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., “place[d] some 
weight” on the position of the Department of Transportation, DOT, in 
favor of preemption, but did not defer to it.75 The Court in Sprietsma, as 
just mentioned, was heavily influenced by the Coast Guard’s position 
  
 68 Id.  
 69 537 U.S. 51 (2002). 
 70 Id. at 59-60. 
 71 Id. at 64-66. Like the NTMVSA, the FBSA had both an express preemption provision 
and a savings clause. Id. at 62-63 (applying 46 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4311 (2000)). 
 72 Id. at 69-70. 
 73 Many have discussed the importance of agency position in preemption analysis. See 
generally Eskridge, supra note 14; Nina Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 
737 (2004); Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the 
Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 227 (2007); see also Ausness, supra note 50, at 
767-75.  
 74 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 495-96 (1996). Justice Breyer concurred, 
agreeing that “the relevant administrative agency possesse[d] a degree of leeway to determine which 
rules, regulations, or other administrative actions will have pre-emptive effect.” Id. at 505-06 
(Breyer, J., concurring). 
 75 Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 881-83 (2000). 
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against preemption. The importance of agency position on preemption, 
and the uncertainty regarding the Court’s position on the matter, has 
compounded the uneasiness of preemption analysis.  
Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC76 offered hope that stability 
might have come to the Court’s express preemption analysis. The Court 
was presented with an express preemption provision, this time from the 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).77 The 
Court, speaking through Justice Stevens, made some important general 
observations about the delicate balance that must be achieved in 
determining the scope of such provisions, and about the effect of shifting 
agency position on preemption analysis. First, the Court gave an 
uncharacteristic endorsement of the longstanding value of tort law as a 
catalyst in the effort to enhance public safety.78 I say “uncharacteristic” 
because the Court’s opinions had most recently failed even to discuss the 
presumption against preemption, much less the value of tort law in 
enhancing public safety.79 The Court employed the narrow express 
preemption analysis it described in Cipollone, specifically rejecting the 
conclusion that common law jury verdicts are the equivalent of 
“requirements” simply because they may influence decision-making.80 
The Court also rejected as irrelevant speculation over whether a jury 
verdict might affect a manufacturer’s conduct,81 and described the proper 
inquiry as an examination of the predicate “common-law dut[ies] in 
issue” to determine whether Congress intended that they be preempted.82 
The Court concluded that the express preemption provision 
preempted very few claims.83 The Court reiterated its adherence to the 
presumption against preemption because tort litigation “provid[es] an 
incentive to manufacturers to use the utmost care in the business of 
distributing inherently dangerous items.”84 The Court also expressed a 
sense of frustration at the way the lower courts had broadly read the term 
  
 76 544 U.S. 431 (2005). 
 77 7 U.S.C. § 136 (2006). 
 78 Bates, 544 U.S. at 449-51. 
 79 Id. at 441. The Court also observed that it was not until Cipollone that preemption 
arguments based on the notion that “requirements” includes common law tort claims began to flood 
the courts. Id. 
 80 Id. at 445. 
 81 Id. (“This effects-based test finds no support in the text of § 136v(b), which speaks 
only of requirements. A requirement is a rule of law that must be obeyed; an event, such as a jury 
verdict, that merely motivates an optional decision is not a requirement.”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 82 Id. (“The inducement test is unquestionably overbroad . . . .”).  
 83 Id. at 451-52. 
 84 Id. at 449; see also id. at 459 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“Today’s decision thus comports with this Court’s increasing reluctance to expand federal statutes 
beyond their terms through doctrines of implied preemption. This reluctance reflects that preemption 
analysis is not [a] freewheeling judicial inquiry into whether a state statute is in tension with federal 
objectives, . . . but an inquiry into whether the ordinary meanings of state and federal law conflict.”) 
(citations omitted) (also endorsing a narrow view of cases in which implied preemption is 
permitted). 
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“requirements” after Cipollone, and chastised the “too quick 
conclusion”85 that claims were also, therefore, preempted under FIFRA.  
Bates also raised the importance of agency position on 
preemption. The regulating agency, the Environmental Protection 
Agency, had shifted its position on preemption in the previous five years 
from being against it to being for it.86 The Court was not influenced by 
that shift in position.87 Rather, the Court noted that “if Congress had 
intended to [prevent the operation] of a long available form of 
compensation, it surely would have expressed that intent more clearly.”88 
The Court endorsed the notion that common law tort claims, enforced by 
private parties, “would seem to aid, rather than hinder, the functioning of 
FIFRA . . . [which] contemplates that pesticide labels will evolve over 
time, as manufacturers gain more information about their products’ 
performance in diverse settings . . . [T]ort suits can serve as a catalyst in 
this process.”89  The concern expressed by the defendant and the EPA 
that “tort suits led to a ‘crazy-quilt’ of FIFRA standards or otherwise 
created a real hardship for manufacturers” fell on deaf ears, as the Court 
observed that “for much of this period EPA appears to have welcomed 
these tort suits.”90 The Court’s skepticism about the sincerity of agency 
position on preemption after such a shift is palpable. 
By 2005, one could fairly describe the Court’s preemption 
personality as a bit Jekyll-and-Hyde-like. Which analysis will apply, 
express or implied preemption? If express preemption analysis applies, 
will it be fair but narrow, or something else? Does a presumption against 
preemption exist or not? What is the role of agency position on 
preemption? Even with such open questions, I might have suggested that 
federal preemption doctrine was approaching stasis. After Bates, it 
looked as if express preemption analysis was taking a more certain 
shape, and, after Geier and Sprietsma, that implied preemption had the 
same potential. But in its 2007-08 term, in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.,91 by 
finding express preemption under the Medical Device Amendments for 
devices that satisfied the pre-market approval process, the Court again 
reflected an aggressive pro-preemption inclination in spite of Sprietsma 
and Bates.92 Some observers describe Riegel as a fairly narrow 
application of the MDA express preemption provision and a logical 
extension of Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr.93 As to the application of the MDA 
preemption provision to the pre-market approval process, that may be so. 
  
 85 Bates, 544 U.S. at 446 (majority opinion). 
 86 Id. at 436-37 & n.7, 449. 
 87 Id. at 449. 
 88 Id.  
 89 Id. at 451. 
 90 Id. at 451-52. 
 91 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008). 
 92 Id. at 1006-11. 
 93 See Sharkey, supra note 9, at 415 nn.3-4. 
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The Court’s language, however, is gratuitous in its criticism of the role of 
common law tort claims and expansive in its description of the scope of 
express preemption where it had not been before. 
There are several reasons that I consider Riegel to be an 
unwarranted extension of preemption doctrine, and these reasons support 
my position that the time has not come to “restate” products liability 
preemption doctrine. First, Riegel purports to be yet another statement on 
how to read express preemption provisions, but it is much broader than 
its predecessors. It is an example of the bankruptcy of the idea that 
express preemption analysis is a search for the clear and manifest intent 
of Congress. In interpreting, now for the second time, the MDA express 
preemption provision which preempts state “requirements” different 
from or in addition to those required by federal regulations, there is little 
discussion of Congress’ intent. The Court’s discussion of the issue in 
Lohr had been badly fractured and so Riegel provided an opportunity to 
explore and clarify the matter. Instead, the Court failed to continue the 
dialogue begun in Lohr about the regulatory effect of common law 
damages actions within the structure of the MDA.94 I realize that some 
members of the Court are reluctant to explore legislative purposes and 
history in statutory interpretation, but even under an “apparent” meaning 
analysis, the Court could have explored what Congress’ intent was in this 
regard, as it had in prior cases. The Court appears committed to the 
position that “requirements” includes common law tort claims, so I will 
not tarry too long expressing my disagreement with this conclusion. I 
will, however, direct all readers to Justice Ginsburg’s persuasive dissent 
in Riegel on this point.95  
In lieu of an analysis of congressional intent as the touchstone of 
preemption analysis, the Court states: “Congress is entitled to know what 
meaning this Court will assign to terms regularly used in its enactments. 
Absent other indication, reference to a State’s ‘requirements’ includes its 
common-law duties.”96 Of course, the MDA was written in 1976 long 
before the Court’s current dictionary of definitions was taking shape. 
Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the Court’s pronouncement, which was 
joined by eight Justices, stands in stark contrast to the decision in Bates, 
just three years earlier, that was significantly more circumspect on the 
meaning of the term “requirement.” One is left to wonder what meaning 
  
 94 Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1007-08. Instead, the Court explains its conclusion about what 
“requirements” means from its own discussion of the term, in Bates involving a statute written in the 
1940s, and in Cipollone involving statutes written in the 1960s. Id. 
 95 Id. at 1013 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens, the author of Cipollone, 
Medtronic, Inc., Sprietsma, and Bates, concurred on the scope of “requirements” because it is 
consistent with the result in Medtronic, Inc. See Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1011-13 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Prof. Rabin’s remarks on this topic at the symposium are 
relevant as well. See Robert L. Rabin, Territorial Claims in the Domain of Accidental Harm: 
Conflicting Conceptions of Tort Preemption, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 987 (2009).  
 96 Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1008. 
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words will have ten, twenty, or thirty years from now, shorn of their 
connection either to ordinary meaning or congressional intent.  
Second, while defining the “normal meaning” of the term 
“requirement” for future congresses, the Court displayed its contempt for 
common law tort actions. According to the Riegel court, tort law as 
applied by juries is simply unfit to regulate. It is “less deserving of 
preservation” than other state regulations.97 Juries are incapable of 
balancing costs and benefits adequately as they “see[] only the costs of a 
more dangerous design, and [are] not concerned with [the] benefits” 
consumers reap by the manufacturer’s design choices.98 It is 
“implausible,” according to the Court, that Congress would create the 
“perverse distinction” that grants greater power to a single state jury than 
to state officials.99  Whether one agrees or disagrees with these remarks, 
there is certainly little, if anything, left of the historic place that state tort 
law held in regulating public safety in them, and certainly little in 
common with Justice Stevens’ remarks on that score in Bates. Such 
comments also seem to have no place in an opinion analyzing the 
meaning of a term used by a Congress, writing in 1976, in response to 
the design and warning labeling failures of the medical device industry 
which had prompted enactment of the legislation.100 Remarks such as 
these also give credence to the criticism that the Court is taking a 
political and policy position in its preemption doctrine, rendering its 
opinions unnecessarily activist. 
Third, the Riegel court discusses, at some length, the effect of the 
FDA’s changing position on preemption, even though it acknowledged 
that the position was not relevant to the case because the statutory 
language was clear.101 The FDA had recently changed its position on the 
scope of the MDA preemption provision as it applied to the pre-market 
approval process.102 It has also done so in a high-profile way in the 
pharmaceutical labeling implied preemption cases.103 While largely dicta, 
the Court’s statements displayed some sympathy for the proposition that 
recent agency position may be relevant to an assessment of current 
preemptive scope, despite longstanding contrary agency position.104 
Some of the Court’s earlier pronouncements on this matter differ from its 
  
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. at 1003; see also id. at 1014-15 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (chronicling the history 
of the MDA and the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device litigation which prompted it). 
 101 Id. at 1009 (majority opinion). 
 102 Id. 
 103 See Davis, The Battle Over Implied Preemption, supra note 3, at 1108-11. 
 104 Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1009 (“But of course, the agency’s earlier position . . . is even 
more compromised, indeed deprived of all claim to deference, by the fact that it is no longer the 
agency’s position.”). 
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discussion in Riegel.105  Both opinions in Riegel recognize the centrality 
of the issue to implied preemption doctrine, and to the pharmaceutical 
labeling case of Wyeth v. Levine in particular.106    
Riegel does not display the search for balance in preemption 
doctrine reflected in the Court’s other opinions. The respect for the 
traditional longstanding role of the common law is absent. Express 
preemption doctrine has some semblance of predictability and stability 
though that predictability is not sufficiently connected to congressional 
intent as it is supposed to be. An example of this disconnect in express 
preemption analysis may be found in Altria Group, Inc. v. Good,107 
decided after Riegel and which involved whether the plurality opinion in 
Cipollone, defining the claims that survived express preemption under 
the cigarette labeling laws, had continuing validity after the ensuing 
sixteen years of preemption doctrine.108 I would have expected, after 
Riegel and its 8-to-1 opinion in favor (in dicta, at least) of a more 
expansive reading of express preemption provisions, that Justice 
Stevens’ plurality opinion in Cipollone was destined for extinction, but I 
would have been wrong. In what can only be described as a stunning turn 
of events in preemption doctrine, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices 
Breyer, Ginsburg, Kennedy, and Souter, held that the plurality opinion of 
Cipollone does, indeed, control the express preemption analysis of that 
statute.109 The majority opinion rejected the broader scope of preemption 
analysis proposed by Justice Scalia in Cipollone, and advocated in Altria 
Group by Justice Thomas for the dissent,110 stating, “Justice Scalia’s 
approach was rejected by seven Members of the Court, and in the almost 
17 years since Cipollone was decided Congress has done nothing to 
indicate its approval of that approach.”111 Justice Stevens returned in 
Altria Group to his opinion in Bates and endorsed the presumption 
against preemption and a fair but narrow reading of the scope of express 
preemption.112  One is also left to wonder what to make of the continuing 
validity of the definition of the term “requirements,” fashioned by the 
majority opinion in Riegel. 
As if the Court’s recent flurry of preemption decisions was not 
enough to digest, the Court agreed to decide in its 2008-09 term an 
implied preemption case involving claims challenging the adequacy of 
  
 105 See discussion of Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, supra notes 76-88 and 
accompanying text; see also Sharkey, supra note 9, at 423. 
 106 Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1009; id. at 1017-19 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 107 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008). 
 108 Id. at 541-42. 
 109 Id. at 549 (“In sum, we conclude now, as the plurality did in Cipollone, that ‘the 
phrase “based on smoking and health” fairly but narrowly construed does not encompass the more 
general duty not to make fraudulent statements.’” (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 
504, 529 (1992)). 
 110 Id. at 545 n.7; see id. at 552-54 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 111 Id. at 545 n.7 (majority opinion). 
 112 See id. at 543. 
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federally approved pharmaceutical labeling, Wyeth v. Levine.113 The 
FDA’s high profile change in position in favor of preemption of common 
law tort claims based on its labeling approval decisions began to make its 
way into briefs on the issue in 2004.114 Many lower courts had struggled 
with implied preemption doctrine in these cases, and what to make of the 
FDA’s recent position shift in that analysis.115 The FDA also described 
that shift in a very controversial discussion in the preamble to a 2006 
pharmaceutical labeling regulation.116 After Riegel and the open debate 
between Justice Scalia in the majority and Justice Ginsburg in dissent 
over the scope of implied preemption in pharmaceutical labeling cases 
and the relevance of agency position on preemption, many observers, 
including several at the symposium, expected the Court to find a narrow 
ground on which to preempt the claims in issue in Wyeth. But, again, the 
Court’s preemption decisions defy prediction. The Court, speaking 
through Justice Stevens with a six-to-three majority, found that the 
FDA’s product labeling approvals did not impliedly preempt Levine’s 
tort claims.117 
Wyeth involved the anti-nausea drug Phenergan which was 
approved in 1955.118 Ms. Levine had been injected with the drug to 
alleviate symptoms from a migraine headache and, through inadvertent 
injection into an artery, gangrene, a known side effect, resulted and her 
arm eventually had to be amputated.119 Wyeth knew about the risk of 
intra-arterial injection, had warned about it in a section of the labeling, 
and that labeling had been approved over the years by the FDA.120 Ms. 
Levine claimed that the labeling inadequately warned of the risk of 
gangrene, and the jury agreed.121 The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed a 
lower court ruling that Ms. Levine’s claims were not impliedly 
preempted by the FDA’s labeling approvals.122 
Wyeth made two separate preemption arguments: first that it 
would have been impossible for it to comply with the state law duty to 
warn without violating federal law.123 Wyeth argued that it would have 
been a violation of federal regulations to alter the Phenergan label 
  
 113 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009). 
 114 See Davis, The Battle Over Implied Preemption, supra note 2, at 1090. 
 115 See, e.g., Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 521 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2008), vacated, No. 08-437, 
2009 WL 578682 (Mar. 9, 2009); Tucker v. SmithKline Beecham, 596 F. Supp. 2d 1225 (S.D. Ind. 
2008); Knipe v. SmithKline Beecham, 583 F. Supp. 2d 553 (E.D. Pa. 2008). 
 116 Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and 
Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3922, 3934 (Jan. 18, 2006). 
 117 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1191. 
 118 Id. at 1192. 
 119 Id. at 1191. 
 120 Id. at 1192. 
 121 Id. at 1192-93. 
 122 Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179 (Vt. 2007). 
 123 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1193, 1196. 
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without first obtaining FDA approval.124 The Court disagreed after a 
thorough exploration of the labeling approval regulations which 
permitted pharmaceutical manufacturers to alter product labels to add or 
strengthen a warning.125 Implied conflict preemption based on the 
impossibility of complying with both federal and state law has only 
rarely been applied, and the Court rejected it in this instance, too.126 The 
Court noted that impossibility preemption is “a demanding defense”127 
and that it would require “clear evidence” of impossibility to succeed.128 
This guidance on implied conflict preemption involving arguments of 
impossibility will be a welcome addition to the Court’s jurisprudence in 
this area. 
Of greater importance, however, is the Court’s discussion of 
general implied preemption principles relating to obstacle conflict 
preemption. Borrowing from the analysis in Geier which supported 
implied conflict preemption, Wyeth had argued that plaintiff’s tort claims 
are preempted because “they interfere with ‘Congress’s purpose to 
entrust an expert agency to make drug labeling decisions that strike a 
balance between competing objectives,’”129 and that set both a floor and a 
ceiling for drug regulation.130 The Court emphatically rejected these 
arguments, noting they rely on an “untenable interpretation” of 
congressional intent and “an overbroad view” of an agency’s power to 
preempt state law.131 
After Riegel, the Court could not have been expected to so 
boldly embrace the regulatory value of state tort law, but it did, 
reiterating adherence to the presumption against preemption.132 It 
explored congressional purposes behind the labeling provisions by 
reviewing how the history of those provisions illuminated Congress’ 
attitude toward complementary state tort litigation. The Court concluded 
that, “If Congress thought state-law suits posed an obstacle to its 
objectives, it surely would have enacted an express preemption provision 
at some point during the FDCA’s 70-year history.”133 Adding to its 
conclusion that Congress did not consider state tort law to be an obstacle 
  
 124 See id. at 1197.  
 125 Id. at 1196-97. 
 126 Id. at 1196-99. 
 127 Id. at 1199. 
 128 Id. at 1198 (“But absent clear evidence that the FDA would not have approved a 
change to Phenergan’s label, we will not conclude that it was impossible for Wyeth to comply with 
both federal and state requirement.”). 
 129 Id. at 1199 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 46, Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 
(2009) (No. 06-1249)). 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. at 1194-95; see also id. at 1195 n.3 (“We rely on the presumption because respect 
for the States as ‘independent sovereigns in our federal system’ leads us to assume that ‘Congress 
does not cavalierly preempt state-law causes of action.” (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 
470, 485 (1996))). 
 133 Id. at 1200. 
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to achieving federal objectives in the area of pharmaceutical labeling, the 
Court rejected as irrelevant the FDA’s “mere assertion” that state law 
poses an obstacle.134 Finding this position at odds with the available 
evidence of Congress’ purposes, the Court explored the many ways that 
tort law acts as a complementary form of drug regulation.135  
After the discussion in Riegel about the negative impact that tort 
verdicts have on regulated industries, the discussion in Wyeth seems to 
be coming from an entirely different court. Compare the following 
language from Wyeth with earlier remarks from Riegel: 
  State tort suits uncover unknown drug hazards and provide incentives for 
drug manufacturers to disclose safety risks promptly. They also serve a distinct 
compensatory function that may motivate injured persons to come forward with 
information. Failure-to-warn actions, in particular lend force to the FDCA’s 
premise that manufacturers, not the FDA, bear primary responsibility for their 
drug labeling at all times.136 
These comments sound like those of Justice Stevens in Bates and are a 
welcome return to greater balance between the role of state tort law and 
the need to give federal regulation the breathing room that Congress 
intended, but no more. 
Finally, because Wyeth had relied on Geier for many of its 
implied preemption arguments, the Court distinguished Geier by noting 
the significant differences in the two regulatory schemes.137 Geier 
involved a formal agency rule-making with a contemporaneous plan to 
implement the defined objectives.138 Wyeth did not. On this point, Justice 
Breyer noted in concurrence that “it is also possible that state tort law 
will sometimes interfere with the FDA’s desire to create a drug label 
containing a specific set of cautions and instructions”139 similar to the 
regulation in Geier, an opinion authored by Justice Breyer. The future of 
implied obstacle preemption will likely be defined, therefore, by the 
thoroughness of federal agency assessment of “lawful specific 
regulations” and not on hindsight case specific evaluations. 
So where does that leave us? Trying to make sense of 
preemption opinions reminds one of being on a roller coaster and, while 
enjoying the ride, getting off is a welcome relief. The uncertainty of 
where the coaster will go, while exhilarating for the time, is also 
exhausting and frustrating. This coaster ride is over for the time being 
though much work is left to be done after Wyeth in deciphering labeling 
approval decisions to identify those that may preempt state tort claims. 
  
 134 Id. at 1201. The Court discussed the FDA’s 2006 drug regulation preamble in which 
the preemption position was most recently articulated and found it did not deserve deference under 
an assessment of its “thoroughness, consistency, and persuasiveness.” Id.  
 135 Id. at 1202-03. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. at 1203. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. at 1204 (Breyer, J. concurring). 
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Two cases were remanded by the Court for further ruling in light of 
Wyeth140 and many others are likely to be reconsidered in its wake. For 
the time being, it is important to point out that under Geier and Wyeth 
opportunities remain to argue for implied preemption in the 
pharmaceutical labeling context, and under other regulatory regimes.  
Building on this assessment of the current, uncertain state of the 
doctrine of preemption, this Article will now identify some of the 
normative concerns that counsel against endorsing preemption doctrine 
in the current preemption climate. First, the Court’s express preemption 
doctrine continues to raise questions about the defining congressional 
intent to preempt. After Riegel’s diatribe against tort law as implemented 
by juries, preemption doctrine would have been fairly criticized as being 
more concerned about reducing the role that tort law will play in the 
world of regulated products than about fairly assessing congressional 
intent to preempt. Whether the historic respect for the role of a robust 
state tort law in enhancing product safety continues or not remains an 
important open question in express preemption cases. Bates and Riegel 
provide inconsistent answers, but they at least openly engage the debate. 
I am in the camp of those who believe that state tort law has an 
important role to play in regulating product safety and that it does not 
create perverse incentives in doing so. Tort law is not of a piece and the 
Court’s suggestion to the contrary in Riegel dismisses the reality that the 
measured evolution of tort doctrines has already incorporated many 
limits to address its alleged excesses. Many states have adopted 
regulatory compliance defenses,141 causation-limiting doctrines and 
apportionment mechanisms,142 limits on non-economic damages,143 and 
other doctrines that limit the potential for excess liability. It also bears 
repeating, as the Court noted in Wyeth, that tort law fundamentally serves 
goals other than regulating conduct: compensation, enhancing the 
availability of risk information, and corrective justice concerns are also 
fundamental to tort law.144 These important objectives should not be 
blithely ignored. 
Second, as confirmed in Wyeth, the presence of a parallel tort 
law regime fulfills the constant and critical need for oversight of the 
  
 140 Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., No. 08-437, 2009 WL 578682 (U.S. Mar. 9, 2009); Pa. 
Employees Benefit Trust Fund v. Zeneca, No. 07-822 (U.S. Mar. 9, 2009). 
 141 See generally Michael D. Green, Statutory Compliance and Tort Liability: Examining 
the Strongest Case, 30 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 461 (1997); see also Carl Tobias, FDA Regulatory 
Compliance Reconsidered, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1003, 1025-27 (2008).  
 142 See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. (2000) 
(describing the wide variety of reform measures apportionment of responsibility). 
 143 See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 384 (2000). 
 144 See generally John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L. J. 513 
(2003) (describing the wide variety of theories that support tort law); John C.P. Goldberg, The 
Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 
115 YALE L.J. 524 (2005) (discussing the view of tort law as a combination of redress of private 
wrongs and regulatory policy). 
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regulatory process.145 Many have expressed the concern that our federal 
agencies are simply ill-equipped to act as the “one-stop shop” for 
insuring product safety.146 One need only look at the failures of weak 
regulatory regimes in recent months to recognize the value of shining a 
light on the dark recesses of our regulatory systems. Those recesses 
result from a host of problems in the way our federal agencies operate: 
from a lack of staffing and funding to insure regulatory compliance to an 
inability to produce complete risk information (either pre- or post-
regulatory decision-making) because the regulated industry is largely in 
charge of that information, to the influence of shifting political winds on 
agency positions.147 These are concerns that stem from the inherent limits 
of the regulatory process. While faith in the expertise and good judgment 
of our regulators is certainly justified, that faith should not be blinded by 
the limitations that the process imposes on them.  
Finally, as a policy matter, a choice has to be made about where 
the risk of uncertainty in the regulatory decision-making process should 
be placed: on the future victim of that uncertainty or the creator of it. 
Reasonable, rational, good faith decisions will be made that will produce 
real and significant harms alongside the benefits of those decisions. 
Inherent uncertainty exists in the current regulatory system because of, 
among other things, information-gathering and enforcement limitations.  
That uncertainty may or may not produce unreasonable risks from 
conduct that leads to common law products liability. If it does, however, 
the traditional tort system should not be prohibited from operating in its 
traditional way without the unquestionably clear intent of our federal 
legislators and regulators that such a result was, in fact, consciously 
considered, contemplated, and desired.  
Much has been written on the effect of limitations on 
information gathering, and that ignoring those limitations can lead to 
analyses that “diverge in significant ways from reality.”148 Questions 
about the character of scientific knowledge and its relationship to the law 
  
 145 For a discussion of the need for regulatory oversight regarding the FDA and its effect 
on implied conflict preemption, see Davis, The Battle Over Implied Preemption, supra note 3, 
at 1148-51. 
 146 See Wendy Wagner, When All Else Fails: Regulating Risky Products Through Tort 
Litigation, 95 GEO. L.J. 693, 695 (2007). Wagner explains: 
[P]rotective regulation is plagued by a variety of important information costs that slow 
and even halt regulatory progress. . . In some settings, the tort system can be more 
effective than the regulatory system in accessing the various types of information needed 
to inform regulatory decisions. Thus, in addition to its critical role in compensating 
victims, the tort system plays an indispensable role in supplementing agency regulation 
of risky products and activities. 
Id.; see also Carter, supra note 8, at 42 (“The FDA is claiming total responsibility for drug and 
medical device safety. Some think it’s a bad idea.”). 
 147 See id. at 44-45. 
 148 Wagner, supra note 146, at 695. 
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abound.149 Scientific certainty and legal certainty are often in conflict; it 
has been said that “[s]cience aims at truth without ever being certain.”150 
Regulatory action based on scientific inquiry suffers from the same 
problem. The limits of human knowledge belie the certainty with which 
the Court tends to view regulatory action.  The tort system places the risk 
of uncertainty on the creator of that risk, providing a necessary incentive 
for regulated industries to reduce reasonably the risk of uncertainty by 
understanding, acknowledging, managing, and disclosing that risk. 
Many scholars have weighed in recently on the debate over 
whether tort law or administrative law should govern the risk inherent in 
the discovery of products and processes that benefit a large percentage of 
the population but, nevertheless, have inherent risks that will inevitably 
burden a smaller percentage of that population.151 These discussions 
include a variety of institutional comparisons and competency 
assessments, noting the differing goals served by the different regimes 
including uniformity, application of technical expertise, the viability of 
optimal safety regulation, the desirability of compensatory remedies and 
the need for oversight and accountability, among others. This larger 
debate over the role of federal agency regulatory action as it relates to 
traditional, state law-based private rights and responsibilities must 
continue. The Court’s preemption doctrine is only one part of this debate. 
The evolution of preemption doctrine since Cipollone in 1992 is 
marked by aggressive efforts to expand its applicability to limit the 
operation of tort laws and to further the reach of uniform federal 
regulation. The relentless pursuit of preemption in the last two decades 
strikes me more as an effort to overcome dissatisfaction with the tort 
liability system than a sincere attempt at discerning congressional intent 
under a particular legislative scheme. The object of modern preemption 
doctrine seems to vacillate between discerning the scope of 
congressional intent, and creating it.  
No Congress writing in the last seventy years can rationally be 
found to have intended to displace the central role that common law tort 
doctrines have held in the goal of enhancing public safety yet such 
arguments are often made. If state product liability and tort doctrines are 
to be re-evaluated because of the perceived limitations they place on 
  
 149 The use of scientific expert testimony in litigation and the uneasy relationship between 
that testimony and proof of legal facts has made a cottage industry out of testifying as an expert. For 
the seminal case discussing the relationship between science and the law, see Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 150 PHILIP WIENER, THE DICTIONARY OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 323 (1973). 
 151 See Richard A. Epstein, Why the FDA Must Preempt Tort Litigation: A Critique of 
Chevron Deference and a Response to Richard Nagareda, 1 J. TORT L. art. 5, at 15 (2006); David A. 
Kessler & David C. Vladeck, A Critical Examination of the FDA’s Efforts to Preempt Failure-to-
Warn Claims, 96 GEO. L.J. 461 (2008); Richard A. Nagareda, FDA Preemption: When Tort Law 
Meets the Administrative State, 1 J. TORT L. art. 4, at 3 (2006); Catherine M. Sharkey, Products 
Liability Preemption; An Institutional Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449 (2008); Peter H. 
Schuck, FDA Preemption of State Tort Law in Drug Regulation: Finding the Sweet Spot, 13 ROGER 
WILLIAMS L. REV. 73 (2008).  
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innovation or some generalized notion of societal welfare, expanding 
preemption doctrine is not the way to accomplish it. That debate should 
be held in the full light of day and not hidden behind the cloud of 
preemption. 
Preemption doctrine is out of balance, uncertain, and unwieldy in 
application. Though the result in Wyeth is consistent with my own 
position on the application of implied preemption doctrine to 
pharmaceutical labeling cases,152 many questions remain about implied 
preemption analysis generally. Now is certainly not the time to restate 
products liability preemption; perhaps by the time we have a Restatement 
(Fourth) of Products Liability. 
  
 152 See Davis, The Battle Over Implied Preemption, supra note 3, at 1151-54. 
